Accepting the US-Israeli position on the Iran strikes would erode the moral permissibilities of international law
The Iran strikes last month not only breached international law norms, but might as well constitutes acts of aggression under the UN Charter. Accepting the US-Israeli justification would mean denouncing the moral permissibilities of just war.
Aftab Alam
Published on: 14 July 2025, 01:05 pm
WHILE THE DUST OF THE IRAN-ISRAEL-US may have temporarily settled under the shadow of a fragile ceasefire, the legal controversies it has stirred will likely reverberate through international legal discourse for years to come. On the night of June 12, 2025, Israel launched airstrikes across Iran targeting its principal nuclear facilities. The United States (U.S.) joined the campaign on June 22 by bombing key Iranian nuclear sites. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu characterised these operations as acts of legitimate self-defence against an existential threat, while U.S. President Donald Trump justified them as necessary pre-emptive measures to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. In sharp contrast, Iran condemned the attacks as flagrant violations of international law. Amid these competing claims, this article seeks to assess whether the Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iran conform to contemporary international law governing the use of force.
The international legal framework governing the use of force
The legal framework regulating the use of force in international relations is rooted primarily in the Charter of the United Nations (‘UN’) and is supplemented by customary international law, much of which has attained the status of jus cogens, as affirmed by the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) in Nicaragua v. United States (1986). At the core of this normative framework lies Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which unequivocally obliges all member states to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.
There are, nonetheless, two notable exceptions under the UN Charter to this general prohibition on the use of force. First, under Article 42, the Security Council is authorised to undertake collective military action after determining, in accordance with Article 39, that there exists a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, and when other measures (such as those set out in Article 41) are deemed inadequate. Secondly, under Article 51, states possess the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs. However, this right is constrained by the principles of necessity and proportionality, and endures only until the Security Council takes measures to restore international peace and security.
At the heart of the present controversy lies the interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Both the text of the Charter and the jurisprudence of the ICJ underscore the restrictive nature of this exception. For instance, in Oil Platforms (2003), the ICJ affirmed that the right of self-defence is triggered only by an actual armed attack; mere threats, hostile rhetoric, or uncertain future risks do not qualify. This interpretation reflects the Charter’s intention to narrow the circumstances in which unilateral force may lawfully be employed.
