The constitutional stakes of Assam’s polygamy ban
As courts move away from insulating personal laws, Assam’s new law brings long-standing tensions between personal law, gender justice, and fundamental rights back into sharp focus.
Tanishka Shah
14 December 2025

ON NOVEMBER 26, the Assam Legislative Assembly passed the Assam Prohibition of Polygamy Bill, 2025, which criminalises the practice of polygamy across the state. Assam will become the third Indian state, after Goa and Uttarakhand’s Uniform Civil Codes, to prohibit polygamy irrespective of religious affiliation, with carve-outs for Scheduled Tribes and Sixth Schedule areas.
The prohibition applies to any individual attempting to marry again during the subsistence of a lawful marriage. Violations invite imprisonment of up to seven years, with penalties rising to ten years when a person conceals an existing marriage. Clauses 10 and 11 of the Bill give discretionary powers to police officials to enter, inspect, and detain or arrest individuals on the basis of a belief that an offence is likely to be committed, thereby creating a wide scope for subjective assessment by law enforcement. Mandatory reporting also risks deepening surveillance of already vulnerable groups, and collateral penalties, such as disenfranchisement or exclusion from welfare schemes, may end up harming women and children more than the men targeted.
In defence of the Bill, Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma asserted that it does not single out any one community and that its provisions would prohibit the practice not only among Muslims but also among Hindus and Christians. This claim of neutrality, however, must be situated within India’s existing legal framework and Assam’s demographic reality. Assam’s demographic estimates in 2021 suggested that Muslims constituted close to 40 percent of Assam’s population, around 14 million out of 35 million. Given this, it does not preclude acknowledging that this Bill will disproportionately impact the Muslim community in Assam.
When the Hindu Code Bill was first presented in the Constituent Assembly, many conservative sections, including the RSS, Hindu Mahasabha, religious leaders, and certain members of the Congress party, had opposed the legislation, framing it as an unwarranted interference in religion.
The different manifestations of polygamy and the risks of selective framing
A few days before the passing of the Bill, Sarma had stated that his administration would continue its measures against what he termed “illegal or suspicious Miyas,” noting that “eviction drives will continue, polygamy will end. Nobody can stop me.” The subtext being that polygamy is exclusively associated with Muslims.
It is important to distinguish between opposition to polygamy itself and opposition to the law’s framing and implementation. Studies show that polygamy reinforces gender hierarchies, and the emotional and economic vulnerabilities among women. Its abolition can be defended on both constitutional and feminist grounds, even if the immediate consequences are unevenly felt. The challenge, however, arises when the political dispensation portrays itself as the protector of Muslim women who must be rescued.
Earlier in 2022, Sarma had stated that a Uniform Civil Code would act as “protection” for “Muslim daughters,” after National Family Health Survey data showed that 3.6% of Muslim women in Assam are in polygamous marriages.
However, another noteworthy fact is the subsistence of polygamy within the Hindu fold. Even after 70 years of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA), 1.8% of Hindu women in Assam are still in polygamous marriages as per NFHS-5. The HMA had sought to establish monogamy as the legal norm for Hindus.
Before the HMA, which formed part of the larger Hindu Code Bill, polygamy was relatively common among Hindus. The 1974 Report of the Committee on the Status of Women in India titled Towards Equality, published by the Ministry of Social Welfare and Education, documented the persistence of polygyny among Hindus, Muslims and tribal communities (see pages 66–67). This report also contained census data for 1951-60, which showcased that across India, polygynous unions were statistically visible: 5.06 percent among Hindus, 4.31 percent among Muslims and 17.98 percent among tribal groups. In her article, Hindu Men, Monogamy and Uniform Civil Code (1995), Flavia Agnes reproduced this data.
When the Hindu Code Bill was first presented in the Constituent Assembly, many conservative sections, including the RSS, Hindu Mahasabha, religious leaders, and certain members of the Congress party, had opposed the legislation, framing it as an unwarranted interference in religion. The Ram Rajya Parishad contended that the Bill conflicted with Indian culture and women’s duties toward husbands, calling for its repeal if enacted. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, then President of India, had remarked that his wife would never support divorce and attributed support for the Bill to “over-educated” women.