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Why Karnataka HC’s refusal to stay SIC’s order banning individual from future RTI requests unsettles a constitutional guarantee

While SICs/CIC may reject particular applications if they fall under the exceptions catalogued in the RTI Act, they cannot impose overarching bans on citizens' right to information.

Syed Raiyyan

22 October 2025

Why Karnataka HC’s refusal to stay SIC’s order banning individual from future RTI requests unsettles a constitutional guarantee

ON OCTOBER 15, THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT REFUSED to stay an order of the Karnataka State Information Commissioner (‘SIC’) blacklisting a person from making further requests for information under the Right to Information (‘RTI’) Act . While doing so, it emphasised that it will not permit the Act to be abused through the filing of an excessive number of applications (which in the present case was 476).

The High Court said that it would first examine the nature of the applications and hear the case on its merits before deciding whether the order was permissible. In taking such an accommodating stance towards the order, the Karnataka High Court seems to have missed a rather obvious legal position – that the Act vouchsafes no power upon the State or Central Information Commission (‘CIC’) to debar individuals from exercising their right to information.

Unfortunately, this practice of blacklisting individuals on the grounds of alleged misuse of the Act is not unheard of. The first such order was passed as far back as 2010, when the Punjab SIC imposed a one-year ban on an RTI activist from seeking information under the Act. Since then, similar orders have been passed by the SICs of at least four more states – Delhi, Gujarat, Karnataka, and Odisha. These orders are generally justified on the ground that the person being debarred has ‘harassed employees’ under the Act, or ‘misused’/‘abused’ the provisions of the Act. This piece contests the validity of this practice. It avers that such orders are ultra vires to the Act and, by extension, the constitutional right to information.

Legal validity of the Orders

The right to information is a fundamental right recognised under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The RTI Act is a channelisation of that right into a concrete structure, allowing the smooth flow of public information to those seeking it. Any restriction placed upon the right should be constitutionally permitted and duly enacted by the legislation. Consequently, such limitations cannot stem from executive orders .

A noteworthy example is the Supreme Court’s decision in Indian Soaps & Toiletries Makers Assn. v Ozair Husain (2013), which concerned an appeal against a Delhi High Court decision that had ordered the Union government to ensure that the packaging of every drug explicitly clarifies whether its ingredients are of vegetarian or non-vegetarian origin. The top Court overturned the decision, holding that though there was a right to know, information could be furnished only “to the extent it is available and possible”. The Court exclaimed that otherwise, the various kinds of vegetarians in India (Jains, “eggetarians,” etc.) could also demand information about “the origin of a vegetarian ingredient.” Employing this sort of slippery slope argument, the SC implicitly recognised expediency and potential misuse that may overburden the State as a limitation on the right.

However, this decision does not relate to the Act. It dealt with the extent of the unsolicited and relevant information that must be provided to the general public. The Act, on the other hand, creates a conduit that allows individuals to demand information held by the Public Authorities through a pathway specially dedicated to this purpose. It sets up institutions that ensure dissemination of information without straining either the government or the seeker. Any stoppages in that pathway paved by the Act must be found in the Act itself, and ‘misuse’ as an exception is nowhere mentioned.

Notwithstanding this, the potential for the misuse of the Act has received judicial acknowledgement. In Central Board of Secondary Education v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (2011), the Supreme Court dissuaded citizens from “[i]ndiscriminate and impractical demands”, which “would be counter-productive” and “result in the executive getting bogged down with the non-productive work of collecting and furnishing information.” Overlooking the apathetic attitude of the Court towards the statutory duty of “collecting and furnishing information”, the words posture as paraenesis for proper use, and not law backed by sanctions.

Importantly, there are precedents of denying information on grounds beyond the limits of Section 8. The CIC in Mr Ramesh Chand Jain v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2012) cited the extra-statutory ground of previous conveyance of information to reject the application. This has further been approved by the Delhi High Court in Shishir Chand v. The Central Information Commission (2023) and has since become a recognised exception.

Since then, similar orders have been passed by the SICs of at least four more states – Delhi, Gujarat, Karnataka, and Odisha.

On barring citizens from filing future applications, the Delhi High Court’s judgment in Shishir Chand is of much relevance. In that case, a citizen had filed multiple applications for information already provided to them, and, as a riposte, the SIC of the State barred them from filing any future application on the subject. The High Court overturned the sanction, asserting that CIC/SICs cannot ban citizens’ future exercising of their right. They may reject particular applications if they fall under the exceptions catalogued in the Act (including when the information has already been provided), but they cannot impose overarching bans on citizens' right to information.

Such orders allow the CIC/SICs to impose blanket bans on citizens’ right to information without any credible and clear criteria. The very determination of what constitutes ‘abuse’ is replete with vagueness. The absence of any clear statutory standard leaves such assessments open to subjective interpretation and arbitrary application, and chips away at the decision in Shreya Singhal. This is a paradigmatic example of executive overreach. In this case, the ‘misuse exception’, merely for rejecting applications, let alone orders inflicting blanket bans, ought to emerge from legislative Acts.

Conclusion

Penalties aimed at preventing the misuse of fundamental rights are not unprecedented. Courts occasionally issue gag orders, and statutes criminalise defamation or speech that offends religious sentiments. In accepting such restrictions, we recognise that rights unaccompanied by accountability can result in disorder. Yet, the Constitution accords fundamental rights a sanctity that shields them from the whims of executive convenience.

Orders blacklisting individuals from filing RTI applications—whether temporary or permanent—represent precisely that: an assertion of administrative ease over constitutional principle. If ‘misuse’ of the Act is indeed a genuine concern, the remedy lies in prompt legislative intervention, not in ultra vires executive sanctions.

Why Karnataka HC’s refusal to stay SIC’s order banning individual from future RTI requests unsettles a constitutional guarantee | The Leaflet