Sabarimala Reference: ‘Non-believer cannot redefine faith’, Review Petitioners conclude nine days of arguments
As the review petitioners wrapped up, the nine-judge Bench heard wide-ranging submissions on who can challenge religious practices, whether Article 25(2) can override denominational autonomy under Article 26, and whether the 2018 Sabarimala judgment itself is liable to be recalled.
Ajitesh Singh
Published on: 29 April 2026, 06:28 am
“A COMPLETE THIRD PARTY, a non-believer, cannot walk into a place of worship and demand that matters of faith must yield to individual claims,” submitted Advocate Nizam Pasha, capturing a thread that ran through the entirety of Tuesday’s proceedings before the Supreme Court.
Yesterday, the Sabarimala Reference saw the Review Petitioners conclude their arguments before a nine-judge Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice Surya Kant. A string of advocates, which included Senior Advocates Sridhar Potaraju and Madhavi Divan, and advocates Nizam Pasha, Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay, and Mathews Nedumpara, alongside several intervenors, addressed the Bench on questions of denominational rights, the reach of social reform under Article 25(2)(b), and the constitutional limits of judicial scrutiny over religious belief.
‘A place of worship is nothing but a belief system’: Advocate Nizam Pasha
Pasha opened by drawing attention to a law student’s petition in the Delhi High Court seeking entry for women to the inner sanctum of the Hazrat Nizamuddin Dargah, which he described as a stark illustration of how the 2018 Sabarimala judgment had been misused. His central submission was that a place of worship embodies a belief system, and that its contours cannot be redrawn by those who do not subscribe to that faith.
Pasha, while relying on Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore (1957), argued that Sufi dargahs of the Chishtiya order qualify as religious denominations entitled to protection under Article 26. He drew a clear distinction between Articles 25 and 26, the former protecting individual conscience, the latter securing the collective right of a religious community to manage its own affairs. Entry rights under Article 25(2)(b), he maintained, were intended to address social reform, not to function as a general override of denominational autonomy.
When Justice Joymalya Bagchi raised concerns about such immunity to religious denominations, Pasha acknowledged that religious practices remained subject to public order, morality, and health, but argued that the scope of social reform was equally bounded by the same constraints. He further submitted that the question of who controls what happens within a place of worship has a clear constitutional answer. “In every single case there will be a right holder,” and that right lies with the denomination.
‘If it is a fundamental right, where is the power to qualify it with tests?’: Senior Advocate Sridhar Potaraju
Potaraju grounded his submissions in the architecture of Part III, contending that the Constitution reflects a conscious act of the sovereign parting with certain powers and reserving others. Once a right is reserved in this manner, the power to impose qualifications upon it does not follow automatically. Judicial tests, he argued, could not be superimposed on freedoms that the Constitution had deliberately left unconditioned.
He pointed out that the Constitution does not define who a ‘Hindu’ is, reflecting the inherent diversity of religious practice in India. Examining religious belief, he submitted, requires operating from within the faith and not from the standpoint of an outsider. Any attempt to shift protections between Articles 25 and 26 would not amount to interpretation, but to a reconfiguration of the constitutional text itself.
‘Article 25 and Article 26 are symbiotic’: Senior Advocate Madhavi Divan
Divan appeared for worshippers of sacred groves, locally known as ‘orans’, in western Rajasthan. In these communities, the forest itself is understood as the manifestation of divinity, with customary practices rooted in non-violence and abstinence. She submitted that such communities, though loosely organised and outside the conventional denominational structure, were fully entitled to protection under both Articles 25 and 26. Individual religious freedom, even in its most personal dimension, freedom of conscience, cannot be exercised in isolation, she argued. It depends on access to shared spaces, institutions, and collective practice. “In order for me to be able to enjoy Article 25, I need Article 26,” she noted.
However, she sounded a note of caution against making Article 25 rights contingent on formal denominational recognition under Article 26. Since Article 25 guarantees rights to “all persons”, what happens to communities that cannot satisfy a strict denominational test? Treating denominational status as a gateway to full constitutional protection, she warned, risked creating conditions where only organised and exclusive communities survived.
