The Supreme Court’s ‘grounds of arrest’ ruling and the Grammar of Due Process

IN A LANDMARK JUDGMENT that could reshape the constitutional architecture of arrest and remand, the Supreme Court on November 6, 2025, held that every person arrested in India must be informed of the grounds of arrest in writing, and in a language they understand. The ruling, delivered in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra (2025), does more than reaffirm an existing procedural safeguard—it constitutionalises it.

The Bench of Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice A.G. Masih declared that “the constitutional mandate of informing the arrestee the grounds of arrest is mandatory in all offences under all statutes including offences under IPC 1860 (now BNS 2023).” In one sentence, the Court bridged a doctrinal gap that had persisted between special statutes like the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (‘PMLA’) or Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (‘UAPA’), and ordinary criminal law under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNS’).

From Procedure to Constitutional Right

For decades, the right to know the grounds of arrest existed more as a ritual than as a reality. Police officers were expected to “inform” an accused of the reason for arrest, but there was no clear constitutional requirement to do so in writing. In Pankaj Bansal (2023) and Prabir Purkayastha (2024), the Court had insisted that written grounds be furnished under special statutes like the PMLA and UAPA - but left ambiguous whether the same protection extended to ordinary offences.

The decision in Mihir Rajesh Shah changes that. The Court located this obligation not merely in statute but in the fundamental rights framework. Citing Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution, the Bench held that “the requirement of informing the arrested person the grounds of arrest, in the light of and under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, is not a mere formality but a mandatory binding constitutional safeguard.”